Governing Gender: Violent Extremism in Northern Nigeria by Okech, Awino
Africa Development, Volume XLVI, No. 3, 2021, pp. 1-19 
© Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2021 
(ISSN: 0850 3907)
Governing Gender:  
Violent Extremism in Northern Nigeria
Awino Okech*
Abstract
This paper draws on a qualitative study piloted in Maiduguri, Northern Nigeria, 
to unpack the gender logics that shape why women join Boko Haram, their 
roles, how they are perceived by their communities on their return and how these 
dynamics inform the ‘deradicalisation’ programmes of the Nigerian government 
and civil society organisations. The study reveals that the absence of a gender 
power analysis reproduces the dominant tropes evident in radicalisation theories 
and programmes about who is radicalised and why, thus limiting a holistic 
response to the factors that drive association with Boko Haram in Northern 
Nigeria. The paper points to the opportunities that a more nuanced reading of 
women’s experiences of associating with armed groups and their return to their 
communities offers to re-conceptualising integration programmes.
Résumé
Cet article s'appuie sur une étude qualitative menée à Maiduguri, dans le nord 
du Nigeria, pour analyser les logiques de genre qui déterminent les raisons 
pour lesquelles les femmes rejoignent Boko Haram, leurs rôles, la manière 
dont elles sont perçues par leurs communautés à leur retour et la manière 
dont ces dynamiques influencent les programmes de « déradicalisation » du 
gouvernement nigérian et des organisations de la société civile. L'étude révèle 
que l'absence d'une analyse de genre et des relations de pouvoir reproduit les 
tropes dominants évidents dans les théories et programmes de radicalisation 
pour savoir qui est radicalisé et pourquoi, limitant ainsi une réponse holistique 
aux facteurs qui poussent à l'association avec Boko Haram dans le nord du 
Nigeria. L'article souligne les opportunités qu'une lecture plus nuancée des 
expériences des femmes associées à des groupes armés et de leur retour dans 
leurs communautés offre pour reconceptualiser les programmes d'intégration.
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Introduction
The implicit construction of men as the most likely targets of radicalisation 
pervades the literature on terrorism and violent extremism (Borum 2011; 
Ogharanduku 2017; Schmid 2014). Women and girls are often portrayed 
as inactive, passive and apolitical, largely experiencing violent extremism 
through abduction, rape and murder. There is a growing body of literature 
that has sought to complicate this bias by framing women as agentic, 
choosing to join insurgent groups for political and personal reasons (Henty 
and Eggleston 2018). However, most gender and violent extremism 
programme strategies by state and non-state actors largely engage women as 
wives and mothers who are mobilised to prevent their children (sons) and 
husbands from being radicalised. What does a gender analysis of violent 
extremism that goes beyond framing women as both victims and villains 
offer? I unpack the gender logics that underpin why women join Boko 
Haram, their roles, how they are perceived by their communities on their 
return and how these dynamics inform the Nigerian government and civil 
society organisation deradicalisation programmes, or not. The absence of a 
gender power analysis reproduces the tropes evident in radicalisation theories 
about who is radicalised and why, thereby limiting a holistic response to the 
factors that drive radicalisation in Northern Nigeria. This paper points to 
the opportunities offered by a more nuanced reading of women’s experiences 
of armed groups to developing comprehensive programmes for countering 
violent extremism.
This article draws on a July 2019, qualitative pilot study conducted in 
partnership with Neem Foundation and the African Leadership Centre.1 
Neem Foundation staff are members of the team that established Nigeria’s 
pioneer Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Programme who also run 
an extensive counselling-on-wheels programme in Maidugiri, to both 
mitigate and respond to the impact of Boko Haram on the community. 
Methodologically, this study takes seriously how power relations impact 
knowledge production on Africa generally, the visibility and impact of 
African scholarship and how this dynamic also translates to the visibility 
and impact of feminist scholarship on security studies specifically (Adegoke 
and Oni 2017; Medie and Kang 2018). Consequently, this paper draws on 
knowledge from below to contribute to a deeper conceptual and practical 
understanding of how gender analysis generally, and women’s experiences 
specifically, can expand our understanding of the drivers of and responses 
to violent extremism in Nigeria. The pilot fieldwork was framed by feminist 
research ethics, which meant paying attention to what it means to do 
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research on this subject and with research participants implicated in Boko 
Haram, given the larger political and binary framing of the actors linked 
to insurgent groups and the impact of asymmetrical warfare (Borum 2011; 
Berntzen and Sandberg 2014).
We drew on qualitative research methods, specifically focus group 
discussions to identify the intersections between social norms, socio-
economic status, gender roles, ethnicity and religion. Given that this study 
was informed by feminist research traditions, which seek to destabilise 
hegemonic and homogeneous categorisations of the social, focus group 
discussions facilitated a complex understanding of the social context and 
relationships (Okech 2013). Consequently, the analysis of the data is attentive 
to contradictions in beliefs, opinions, emotions and discursive relationships 
between individuals. The focus group discussions were conducted in Bakassi 
internally displaced people’s (IDP) camp in Maiduguri, Northern Nigeria, 
with women associated with Boko Haram. I draw on reflections from six 
focus group discussions conducted with women formerly associated with 
Boko Haram, and community members in Maiduguri. In keeping with 
research ethics, the participants were anonymised, represented here through 
numbers and letters linked to different focus group clusters. We met a total 
of thirty-five people over four days. Of these, twenty-five were women 
associated with Boko Haram and ten were men community members.
I supported a team of Neem Foundation research assistants in designing 
the focus group discussion guide, provided training support and shadowed 
three focus group discussions, given language limitations. Shadowing, as 
a research methodology, can be described as ‘observation on the move’ 
(Czarniawska 2014:43). Shadowing is not limited to understanding the data 
collection and analyses only, but also offers insights into the research process, 
which informs how knowledge is produced through research (Cohen and 
Manion 1989). As a shadow researcher, I had a back-seat view of the process, 
in terms of observing the research assistants and the interactions between the 
research participants and their encounters with the research assistants. As an 
outsider, a Kenyan woman with a language barrier, I was aware that my 
presence could be a hindrance, therefor we devised a range of strategies to 
ensure that my presence was not a distraction. The methodological lessons 
from this process will be explored in a separate paper.
In going to the field grounded in reflexive research praxis, the research 
team was attentive to how research questions were framed, the environment 
of the focus group discussions and the importance of creating space for 
women to engage freely. These decisions were critical given the cultural 
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context that mediates interactions between women and men. However, the 
combination of cultural dynamics and insecurity impacted our ability to 
have a mixed gender team of research assistants who could speak the local 
language fluently. Consequently, the research assistants were all men, which 
affected the extent to which some conversations could be pursued. As a pilot 
study, lessons on the conditions of the research environment are critical to 
the design of future projects. We were also attentive to the psychosocial 
issues that might emerge when dealing with survivors of deeply traumatic 
experiences. In this regard, the partnership with Neem Foundation, a non-
governmental organisation whose staff have twenty years of cumulative 
experience in psychological/ psychosocial support, as well as extensive 
training and experience in countering violent extremism and motivating 
community engagement as a direct response to insecurity in Nigeria, was key. 
This qualitative pilot study contributes to understanding the experiences 
of women associated with Boko Haram. I use ‘associate’ rather than ‘join’ 
to highlight the complexity that informs why women align themselves 
with Boko Haram and the roles they play within the group. The analysis 
of the conversations with the interlocutors in the focus group discussions is 
informed by Mbembe’s (2003) Necropolitics, which argues for an expansion 
of how we think about sovereignty, not in the political nation/ state sense, 
but as the exercise of control over mortality (death) and life (living) as a 
manifestation of power. Mbembe (2003) argues that sovereignty becomes 
about ‘the generalised instrumentalisation of human existence and the 
material destruction of human bodies and populations’. Part of this 
instrumentalisation is what I call the democratisation of violence through 
urban militias, private armies, insurgent groups such as Boko Haram, and state 
armies, who all claim the right to exercise violence or to kill. Consequently, 
according to Mbembe (2003), in a society where the possession and non-
possession of weapons define one’s social value, all social bonds are destroyed, 
thus normalising the ‘idea that power can be acquired and exercised only at 
the price of another’s life’.
In exercising sovereignty over life and death, one can argue that those 
who associate with the group are seeking to leverage the sovereignty offered 
by necropolitics in a context where powerlessness has characterised their 
lives. This power, as will be shown in the sections that follow, does not 
necessarily alter gender norms but relies on them to claim certain levers of 
access and authority that were hitherto unavailable in their ‘normal’ lives. 
In the sections that follow, I explore how gender is governed by unpacking 
women’s motivation to join Boko Haram, their roles and how they are 
received on return into their communities. Governing gender is used as 
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a framework to examine the terms by which gender is constituted in the 
context of insurgency. I examine the regulatory forces that define gender 
relations within Boko Haram camps and therefore become central to systems 
of governing within the group. I also use governing gender to interpret how 
women, in particular, shape gender norms outside the modes of regulation 
by Boko Haram and the Nigerian state. Analytically, I use thematic analysis 
to make sense of the focus group discussions (Braun and Clarke 2006). 
Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria
Maiduguri, the site of this qualitative study, can be described as the epicentre 
of Boko Haram attacks. As the capital city of Borno State, it joins Yobe, Kano, 
Bauchi and Kaduna in Northern Nigeria as one of the targets of the Boko 
Haram insurgency and therefore one of the most vulnerable. Since 2003, 
Boko Haram tactics across these states have included attacks on military 
barracks, police stations, raids on communities and abductions, largely of 
locals and some foreign nationals (Pillay 2018). The 2014 abduction of 
approximately 276 teenage girls from a boarding school in Chibok in Borno 
gained global attention. Cumulatively, these actions have led to loss of life, 
displacement of communities, states of emergency, closure of schools and 
overall insecurity in the region. Maiduguri has been hardest hit by Boko 
Haram’s activities, and, as a result, the Bakassi camp hosts approximately 
34,000 internally displaced people (UNOCHA 2020).
Pereira (nd) notes that discriminatory features of Nigeria’s state processes 
and practices restrict the character of citizenship, thereby discriminating 
against women. The specificity of discrimination in Northern Nigeria 
was made palpable by the 2002 case against Amina Lawal. Amina Lawal 
was sentenced to death by stoning, by a Regional Court in Katsina State, 
Nigeria, for having a child outside marriage. Her sentence was announced 
on 23 March 2002, but subsequently withdrawn on 23 September 2003, 
in large part due to national and international advocacy by women’s rights 
organisations. Pereira (2005) underscores the significance of history and 
politics in the interpretation of cultural practices, including practices integral 
to heterosexual culture. Lawal’s case above is characteristic of a region where 
religious and cultural norms intersect to define women’s status through 
social reproduction. Consequently, women’s access to education and the 
formal labour market is restricted, and they do not own land or homes, 
which increases an overreliance on masculine patronage and, therefore, 
their vulnerability. These cultural, religious and legal inequalities, combined 
with poverty, have resulted in low school attendance and high rates of child 
marriage for women and girls (Imam, Biu and Yahi 2020).
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A rapid gender assessment conducted by UN Women, Oxfam and Care 
in 2020 noted that over 80 per cent of internally displaced people (IDPs) in 
Northern Nigeria are in Borno State (the epicentre of the crisis) and 79 per 
cent of them are women and children (Unaegbu, Kimiri and Agada 2020). 
Vulnerability assessments show that women-headed households are at higher 
risk of sexual and physical violence, and are more likely to experience rape, 
sexual abuse and sexual exploitation, such as engaging in transactional sex 
with humanitarian aid workers, security forces and community members 
who have access to food, shelter or non-food items (Unaegbu et al. 2020). 
Northeast Nigeria is still shaped by patriarchal values in which religious and 
cultural beliefs appoint men as the head of the household, a relationship of 
power that extends to every facet of women’s and girls’ lives. The choices and 
experiences of the women engaged in this qualitative pilot study need to be 
understood within the context set out above. The section that follows sets 
out a broad framework for understanding Boko Haram in Nigeria, drawing 
on scholarship that expands a reading of why and how insurgent groups 
come to flourish.
In the last two decades, there has been a shift in how conflict and wars 
manifest. This is evident in a marked decrease in interstate conflicts, the 
increase of organised violence and the critical role of non-state actors in 
the emergence and sustainment of conflict and proxy wars, fought over the 
control of natural resources in sovereign territories. All these developments are 
profoundly gendered and are linked to the maintenance and or challenging 
of existing gender regimes that tend to privilege certain forms of femininities 
and masculinities. Globally, there is a confluence of factors at play. The first 
factor is the larger geopolitical question, which places state formation and the 
creation of stable states elsewhere in direct conversation with the sustainment 
of a global power axis that constructs a few powerful states as arbiters of global 
political order. The second factor is the privatisation of the state as a cumulative 
result of externally driven programmes, such as Structural Adjustment and its 
successor policies, which have foregrounded the advancement of neoliberal 
globalisation at the expense of a resolution of the vast structural inequalities 
in the countries where these programmes were implemented. Third, the 
management, governance structures and opponents in any given conflict 
involve multilayered local, national, regional and global institutions.
It is in this environment that groups such as Boko Haram emerge. Boko 
Haram is now understood to be a consequence of overlapping religious, 
historical and political histories and actors specific to Northern Nigeria. 
Hansen notes that rather than viewing Boko Haram as new, it is important 
to root the group in an ongoing history of Islamic phenomena in the region 
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(Hansen 2017). Declarations of jihad for the purposes of Islamic societal 
revolution have long been common in the region. Different forms of Islamic 
practice against the state, advocated by the dispossessed, began to develop 
based on the central demand for the establishment of a societal order 
founded on sharia law (Hansen 2017). Pertinent to Boko Haram’s history 
is the normalisation of the denouncement of others as non-Muslims, which 
emerged in the 1970s. According to Paden, this practice of declaring others 
to be non-Muslim (takfir) began to be extended by some to anyone outside 
of their group (Paden 2005). It is also important to consider the intersection 
of colonial history and religiosity. Hansen (2017) and Musa (2010) note 
that the core driving force behind the denouncement of Western education 
in Boko Haram’s messaging is inseparable from histories of imperialism 
in which Muslim knowledge production, literary histories and means of 
communication were disrupted.
The politicisation of religion is argued to be grounded in structural 
inequalities. Religion itself has been proven to have less impact on association 
with extremist groups than other structural issues that dominate lived 
experiences (Alao 2013; Bamidele 2016). Botha and Abdile (2019) extend 
this analysis by charting how the division between the Christian south and 
Muslim north of Nigeria is exacerbated by an environment in which Muslims 
are politically and economically marginalised. Hansen (2017) continues, 
noting that the rhetoric of ‘evil’ or terrorism fails to adequately capture Boko 
Haram as a logical consequence of the failures of the Nigerian state. The 
failure of the post-independence state to provide significant infrastructure 
for healthcare and education, especially in Northern Nigeria, demonstrates 
how semi-industrial capitalism and the legacies of colonialism have created 
ripe conditions for corruption, exploitation and extraction. Botha and 
Abdile (2019), Agbiboa (2014) and Hansen (2013) argue that far more than 
religious indoctrination, poverty, corruption, unemployment and the unequal 
distribution of wealth and opportunities were important contributing factors 
to people’s decision to join the group. Boko Haram infuses religion into a 
history of grievances (Agbiboa 2014). By reframing ‘terrorism’ in terms of state 
neglect, a more nuanced picture of the sociopolitical landscape is made visible.
The evolution in the understanding of violent extremist groups such as 
Boko Haram, in scholarship, is not matched by the literature that engages 
gender and violent extremism (Giscard d’Estaing 2017). Women and girls 
are often depicted as solely affected by violence through abduction, rape 
and death (Gonzalez-Perez 2008). But the idea of violence generated by 
insurgent groups against women and girls has steadily been challenged by 
emerging studies. In a study on the gender-based violence perpetrated by 
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Boko Haram, Oriola (2017) notes that gender-based violence reflects how 
women are generally treated. The violence perpetuated by Boko Haram on 
women reflects ongoing and persistent patriarchal encounters within the 
region. Boko Haram’s treatment of women, particularly in their abduction, 
exposes a deeper, more pervasive way in which women experience the world. 
Feminist security studies scholarship, complicates our understanding of 
the role that women play within insurgent groups, and the impact of their 
association with these groups by moving beyond their historical framing as 
unagentic, absent and apolitical (ICG 2016).
Associating With Boko Haram
Studies on gender and violent extremism point to how structural 
inequalities collide with recruitment into violent extremist groups (ICG 
2016). Poverty, patriarchy, corruption and state responses (or the lack 
thereof ) to socioeconomic dispossession are key contributory factors for 
women’s association with insurgent groups like Boko Haram (Kessels, 
Durner and Schwartz 2016). As illustrated below, the discussions with 
women associated with Boko Haram point to poverty and broader 
economic inequalities as key drivers for their association with Boko 
Haram. I distinguish here between association based on coercion and force 
and association informed by an assessment of where positive outcomes lie. 
As I will illustrate in the sections that follow, these positive outcomes 
are shaped by a promise of economic freedom that is accessible to both 
women and men, which is at odds with a society that provides this option 
for men only. This is the first mode of governing gender relations deployed 
by Boko Haram, as the excerpts below illustrate.
Participant A:2 Because of the high rate of poverty and hunger during the time 
Boko Haram were active in our community, majority of goods and property 
of people had been destroyed by the armed group. That in turn made most 
of the women and girls become very vulnerable whilst Boko Haram were 
having abundant food, clothes, shelter, freedom etc. That also made women 
and girls think about joining Boko Haram and they eventually joined. 
Participant B: I feel that a lot of people, not just women, were very interested 
in the economic benefits that the group provided at the time; because many 
people felt that they were going to gain in terms of monetary benefits. Let 
us not forget that at a time the group were offering financial loans to people. 
I feel this must have influenced many to join.
Participant C: Most women that join Boko Haram from the Gwoza 
community joined for economic benefits. They were lured, brainwashed and 
radicalised. They voluntarily followed Boko Haram members to Sambisa 
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Forest. Those women saw that Boko Haram members had money and 
were very generous at the time. They lured women with food and money 
so much so that many women in the community wanted to get married to 
Boko Haram men.
However, all the participants above also highlight how Boko Haram’s tactics 
create the conditions for economic distress, through the destruction of 
property, frequency of attacks that lead to curfews and the eventuality of a 
depressed economy. Participants B and C specifically note the connection 
between causing economic distress and promising economic benefits as a 
tactic pursued by Boko Haram, which therefore becomes a mobilisation 
tactic. The research participants’ views above connect structural inequalities 
to the vulnerability of communities to Boko Haram, an observation that 
is picked up in a range of studies, including those analysing the entry of 
Al Shabaab in Kenya (Badurdeen 2018a; Okech 2018). Like Al Shabaab, 
Boko Haram’s choice of Maiduguri is linked to the geography and historical 
under-investment in the region by successive governments, as was pointed 
out earlier in this paper. Consequently, limited economic opportunities 
make both men and women more vulnerable to choices based on survival.
The conservative nature of the region, shaped by the nexus of gender, 
class, religion and culture, means that women tend to have limited economic 
opportunities. This is tied to the reliance on gender stereotypes that see 
their role as limited to social reproduction—motherhood, wifehood and, 
therefore, household. This specific vulnerability attached to women creates 
a desire for economic independence that is utilised by Boko Haram as a 
recruitment strategy. While this can be read as a gendered vulnerability, it 
can also be understood as an illustration of how the gender norms governing 
the society are outwardly challenged by a group whose key interest is in 
mobilising labour towards its cause. The promise of greater economic 
freedom therefore becomes an opportunity that women seize.
 Additionally, Boko Haram’s tactical use of violence in a society where the 
state is viewed as being on the backfoot of a ragtag group, creates political 
value for Boko Haram. The group’s ability to exercise power over those who 
live—those who associate with the group—and those who ‘die’—who are 
displaced and consequently die socially—normalises the ‘idea that power 
can be acquired and exercised only at the price of another’s life’ (Mbembe 
2003:11–12). Beyond the economic conditions, the power over life—
necropolitics—is a key factor that shapes association with Boko Haram. 
The choice to associate with a group that is constructed as and appears to be 
more powerful than the state, due to its ability to take life, is an association 
with a source of power, as the excerpts below point to.
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Participant D: My husband was killed by Boko Haram and I followed my 
father to live with him under Boko Haram due to fear of soldiers. They 
wanted to kill my father because one of the Boko Haram members married 
his daughter. 
Participant E: Boko Haram used money and flashy items to influence women 
and children to join them. They even had more guns than the military. They 
had a fleet of cars that they used to raid communities and villages, which led 
them to think Boko Haram was more powerful than the army.
Participant F: In the beginning of the insurgency, the group came into our 
community and portrayed themselves as Islamic religious scholars; they 
preached and empowered community members. The group was not violent at 
this point, which was why it was easy to brainwash the community members 
to join their cause. When the group later became violent, the community 
members started to flee from Gwoza.
Participant G: Boko Haram is a religious group that forces their beliefs on 
people. They forcibly recruit members. Anyone that fails to join gets killed; 
however, they do not harm women because they are mothers.
It is equally evident from the above that the monopoly of violence exercised 
by Boko Haram is a tactical tool used to govern gender. The decision to 
abduct rather than exercise other forms of physical abuse implies the use 
of violence as a mediating force for gender relations. Women and girls are 
mobilised for their social reproduction capacities and, as illustrated in the 
sections below, the gender stereotypes about women’s roles serve a larger 
political purpose for those who are politically aligned to the group. 
In the sections that follow, I observe that Boko Haram does not radically 
alter gender dynamics in the way in which it treats women within the 
camps. There is a patriarchal continuity in the expectation that women 
will play domestic roles. However, a range of power hierarchies emerge that 
are linked to how different women and girls arrive in the camps and their 
links with key men members of Boko Haram. It is these power hierarchies 
that illustrate how gender is governed within Boko Haram ‘territory’ and 
how positive outcomes for women associated with Boko Haram should be 
viewed in relation to how gender is governed in society generally.
Reclaiming Agency
A binary approach to understanding power relations is well explored in 
feminist scholarship, showing that powerlessness is not a useful way to 
understand women’s experiences (Amadiume 1997; Lazreg 1994). Women 
are not homogenous, which means that various factors such as class, age 
and reproductive capacity intervene to shape the power that different 
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women will hold in any context (Pereira nd). Hierarchies of power and 
powerlessness therefore become the lens through which I view the roles that 
the women associated with Boko Haram play. In examining these roles, it is 
critical to retain a focus on the minor structural shifts in the conditions of 
women who in their societies are considered second-class citizens.
Participant 1: In my opinion, some of the people including young women join 
the group to get power. This makes them feel they have a purpose. Because 
many people who were nothing suddenly had domestic workers for chores 
and many men obeying them as wives of top figures in the group.
Participant 2: Let’s not forget that some women had important roles in 
the camp, others served as recruiters and even were trained to preach these 
ideologies to other women to make it as appealing as possible. These women 
who are part of this group go further to convince their relatives especially 
their husbands to join Boko Haram. It depends what kind of role you can 
play, sometimes some were informants within and outside the camp.
Participant 3: Women are also used in the combat field more often than 
before as they commit suicide while attacking/targeting security personnel, 
community members particularly in very crowded areas. Most are young 
individuals who are selected for this cause from the beginning of indoctrination, 
and they include women because they are less suspicious in crowds.
Participant 4: The women and girls who willingly join the group were kept in 
a separate place called Parisu, they were enjoying their life very comfortably 
and they were very happy to be part of Boko Haram. Most of them had the 
role of service especially cooking roles as the most common work the women 
did there. When their men return from combat against the armed forces, 
they will hail their husbands as heroes and support them.
The four participants above draw attention to the hierarchies of power that 
shape women’s roles within Boko Haram and how they establish access to 
power that most of these women did not have prior to being associated with 
the group. The first hierarchy is raised by participants two and three, who 
highlight the recruitment role that women who join Boko Haram willingly 
play. This is an important subversion of how women are understood as 
political actors because it points to women as conveyors of political beliefs and 
ideologies to secure more members. The task of recruitment should not be 
constructed as a simple task of translating an organisation’s view. It indicates 
an internalisation of the political beliefs to undertake their task effectively. 
In addition, a second layer of power lies in the recruitment of family 
members who are not part of the group. This also illustrates the agency that 
these women have exercised in leaving husbands and extended families behind 
to pursue what they construe as better living conditions for themselves. 
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The third layer of power explored by participant two is the role of 
women as informants. The fact that women have historically been viewed 
as good spies in conflicts and world wars is well established (see Amrane-
Minne and Abu-Haidar 1999; Higonnet, Jenson, Michel and Weitz 
1987). Women’s ability to do this work well is based on gender stereotypes 
of women as apolitical, not threatening and generally invisible, thus 
making it easier for them to gather information. The reliance on gender 
stereotypes of women as temptresses, lovers or harmless people is a route 
that Boko Haram uses to subvert societal governing principles of gender 
to their advantage. When women’s invisibility is enhanced by cultural and 
religious norms, mobilising these stereotypes as an asset illustrates how 
Boko Haram uses gender to govern its relationship with women recruits 
and expand its networks.
Participants one and four draw attention to gender hierarchies that are 
connected to how patriarchal structures distribute power amongst women. 
The class differences play out here in relation to who has access to workers 
and who performs which domestic tasks. These roles are often linked to 
specific women’s proximity to masculine power, such as leaders and or 
fighters within Boko Haram. This proximity to masculine power offers 
them privileges, such as domestic support and authority to oversee other 
women. The importance of this power lies in the fact that these are privileges 
these women did not enjoy in their communities. Women who join Boko 
Haram, whether willingly or not, come from lower socioeconomic strata. 
For them, access to domestic help in the household is a privilege often 
available only to families with greater economic mobility and social capital, 
which allows them to either pay for labour or mobilise the free labour of 
younger relatives.
The power hierarchies above, when framed as part of the broader logics 
of violence that inform Boko Haram, are therefore not only gendered but 
also draw a direct link to necropolitics, which has created a divide between 
those who are protected because they are armed and those who are not. 
The power that women derive from being associated with those who can 
exercise sovereignty over life points to a broader layer of power associated 
with greater societal outcomes, particularly where violence has been 
democratised due to asymmetrical violence. This broader sociopolitical 
power that women acquire is connected to necropolitics and is a critical 
point to bear in mind later in this paper, when reintegration for returnees 
and community responses are examined.
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Governing Gender
Access to economic power and its attendant privileges has been illustrated 
as a core driver for women choosing to be associated with Boko Haram. 
The allure of these privileges is reinforced by a cultural environment that 
does not provide these rewards, particularly for women who do not have 
class privilege. As illustrated above, hierarchies of power across women are 
made visible by economic mobility, proximity to masculine power within 
the Boko Haram structures and the nature of political tasks they take on 
within the organisation. Undergirding their decisions are basic survival 
concerns such as access to food as well as the power privileges within the 
camps. If access to and benefiting from new power and privileges frames 
some women’s encounters in the ‘bush’, how do they navigate their return 
to communities that remain socioculturally unchanged and their relocation 
to a transient and economically unstable environment—the IDP camp?
Participant K (community member): Their families were considered associated 
with the group, so they were stigmatised.
Participant L (community member): The men are not easily accepted back; 
they are treated with suspicion. Just recently more than fifty men were brought 
into the Bakassi camp from the ‘Operation Safe Corridor’. Unfortunately 
they were rejected by the communities because they were still considered to 
be associated with Boko Haram.
Participant M (community member): The security is getting worse, and most 
people here are not ready to accept them back, we are hurt, we are also scared, 
and we just want to move on.
Participant N (community member): At the moment people are not ready to 
accept those who have returned because they are still considered Boko Haram 
members. They are likely to accept women and girls more easily.
Participant O (community member): I think we have established there are 
mixed feeling, mostly women and girls can be easily accepted although not 
entirely the case but they have high possibility of acceptance than that of 
male counterparts.
The excerpts above from the focus group discussion with men community 
members point to stigma and exclusion as a central narrative that shapes 
how women and men associated with Boko Haram experience their return 
to their communities. Men are considered more dangerous than women and 
this is clear from participants six, eight and nine. The fear associated with 
Boko Haram as a group that has terrorised the community extends to those 
who are seen as having willingly joined the group, as well as to their families. 
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Two of Mbembe’s ideas are worth drawing on here to understand the stigma 
and loss experienced by returnees and community members who were 
displaced by Boko Haram. The first idea is the conceptualisation of triple 
loss—the loss of a ‘home’, loss of rights over the body and loss of political 
status that leads to social death (Mbembe 2003:21). The community 
members above who are now displaced and living in an IDP camp are faced 
with multiple losses that are directly attributed to Boko Haram.
The loss and social death described by Mbembe (2003) offers a broader 
framing of the roots of the stigma targeted at returnees, which is not simply 
about association with the group and the threat that returnees may pose 
but is linked to their current social conditions of undignified life aptly 
captured by participant M. However, social death is shared. Returnees do 
not necessarily experience greater privilege, since the losses experienced 
by communities are similar to those that the returnees negotiate, as I will 
explore below. 
The rest of the participants’ perceptions and views on risk related to 
men and women returnees are best understood through Mbembe’s second 
idea (2003:12), which is the articulation of the relation between the 
state of exception created by violent extremism (curfews, displacement) 
and a relation of enmity that becomes the norm due to the right to kill 
and sovereignty over life exercised by Boko Haram as a direct result of 
necropolitics. In essence, whose lives are worth saving and why frames the 
stigma experienced by women returnees, as illustrated below. Returnees 
who ‘chose’ to associate with Boko Haram are constructed as people’s whose 
lives, and therefore wellbeing, hold greater value than those who remained 
‘socially dead’, and this underpins the hostility and stigma they encounter.
Participant 10: Initially we face a lot of stigmatisation and verbal attacks. 
People in the camp call us names like bomb makers and all that. Initially, 
people were sceptical about our presence in the camp, to the extent that they 
do not sleep at night because of fear. There was no trust, even our friends 
and relatives who should show love, concern and accommodate us were 
not forthcoming, and that was how bad it was. But things have changed a 
little though, not completely because even now, I am suffering from trauma 
mainly due to attacks from the camp community. Sometimes when such 
abuses coincide with my children’s offences, it affects my blood pressure and 
makes me sick for some days.
Participant 11: People who were associated with armed groups go through 
difficulty from their families and relatives. They are stigmatised and ostracised 
from their community because their families called them killers and kept 
a distance from them. Some people will even threaten to take revenge for 
things that happened to their loved ones, though they were warned not to 
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but to clean them off from their previous sins and shelve them from hell fire 
in the life hereafter. People who have grievances with them will refrain from 
taking retribution and this is what makes the returnees move away from their 
families to a place they are not known.
Mbembe’s (2003:40) ‘death-worlds, new and unique forms of social 
existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life 
conferring upon them the status of living dead’ best captures what 
women associated with Boko Haram encounter on their return. There is a 
contradictory convergence of interests between Boko Haram’s production of 
large-scale death and disruption of life and the state’s response through the 
sequestering of populations in IDP camps contributing to social death. IDP 
camps therefore become a space of governing unwanted women where the 
risk they pose to society can be effectively controlled through re-integration 
processes that simply write them back into existing gender norms. 
In a context where ostracisation and powerlessness—economic, social 
and cultural—characterises their return, what should government strategies 
to rehabilitate and reintegrate women associated with Boko Haram look 
like? How can their sovereignty be renegotiated within a state that has failed 
them? If a return to the ‘bush’ is considered problematic given the violence 
wrought by Boko Haram, how can reintegration strategies reduce the 
attractiveness of the ‘bush’ due to the autonomy and sovereignty provided 
therein? Can the modalities of governing gender in society be fundamentally 
rewritten due to violent extremism?
Concluding Notes
The Nigerian government’s integration strategies have largely assumed a 
return to normalcy by integrating women into a life they had prior to their 
association with Boko Haram. Government strategies include providing 
women returnees with economic opportunities for survival. This economic 
focus is viewed by community members as being disproportionately aimed at 
people who contributed to the suspended, undignified life they have to live 
within the IDP camp. In essence, those who suffered do not receive special 
treatment but are ranked on par with those they see as having caused harm. 
The notion of favouritism emerged as a common thread in discussions with 
community members who now live in IDP camps. The stigma therefore is 
not simply due to a fear of terror as described in the focus group excerpts 
above, but to a sense of having been let down by the government.
It is evident that these responses are not responsive to the gender 
disruption in the ‘bush’, which women returned often viewed as positive 
(see CDD nd). In addition, civil society interventions, such as psychosocial 
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and economic support, cannot effectively broker a return from the social 
death experienced by women associated with Boko Haram (CDD nd). 
Within the community, men in particular view ‘marriageability’ as an 
effective indicator of a return from social death. In essence, the fact that 
men feel comfortable considering marrying women associated with Boko 
Haram indicates that they are accepted in the community. However, it 
follows that women who exercised a fair amount of agency in the ‘bush’ 
do not necessarily view a return to subjugation as an equitable negotiated 
settlement for their integration.
This pilot study echoes findings from an International Crisis Group 
report on Northern Nigeria and mirrors findings from the Horn of Africa 
in connection to Al Shabaab (ICG 2016; Badurdeen 2018a and b). 
However, there are two recommendations that I would like to make that 
are derived from the theoretical framework adopted for this study, which 
do not necessarily surface in existing work on Northern Nigeria and women 
associated with armed groups. The first concerns government and civil 
society interventions. It is evident that a response to reintegrating women 
returnees has to address the sociocultural context that they return to. The 
patriarchal conditions that shape the attractiveness of Boko Haram camps 
create pull factors that drive women associated with armed groups back 
into the camps or away from the community. The fact that there is a public 
perception that women’s integration is easier than men’s does not address the 
loss of power that women returnees encounter. Marriageability as integration 
misses the fundamental power fracture occasioned by being in the ‘bush’ and 
navigating multiple ‘positive’ power hierarchies, as articulated by the focus 
group participants. In addition, providing economic opportunities that are 
still reliant on a gendered division of labour does not address the situation of 
‘social death’ as articulated by Mbembe. In essence, there is a question here 
about the reconfiguration of gender power relations, not necessarily gender 
dynamics, that is missed in ongoing interventions.
Finally, the focus group participants point to their role in indoctrination and 
recruitment. Integration and deradicalisation programmes directed at people 
who have played the above roles in insurgent groups seek to shift the ideological 
base rather than recognise the outcomes derived from these roles, which are not 
always connected to belief systems. These outcomes are connected, in the case 
of these women, to accessing power and benefiting from relationships to power 
based on the roles they perform. Deradicalisation efforts that do not engage 
with the outcomes derived from doing this work means that the women who 
are the focus of this paper see the ‘bush’ as a better option, given the power 
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outcomes derived from this association. This recommendation speaks to the 
patriarchal dividends alluded to in recommendation one and the absence of a 
rewarding economic base that deals with the economic conditions that led to 
the women’s association with Boko Haram. 
Notes
1. My fieldwork was made possible by a seedcorn grant from SOAS.
2. The differences in numbers and letters linked to participants denote focus 
group clusters.
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